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Abstract: Biometric template protection systems are expected to meet two major se-
curity requirements: irreversibility and unlinkability. We analyze the Bloom filter
based iris biometric template protection system recently introduced by Rathgeb et al. at
ICB 2013 and IET Biometrics 2014. We demonstrate that the scheme does not achieve
unlinkability, presenting a simple attack that in the worst case succeeds with probabil-
ity at least 96%. We also present a security analysis on generating false positives or
recovering the key, both leading to undesirably low attack complexities: 225 for gener-
ating false positives for the smaller versions of the scheme, and a complexity between
22 and 28 for recovering the secret key.
1 Introduction
Security systems based on iris biometric recognition [BHF08,Dau93,RUW13] find myriad
practical applications, including border control, forensics, access control, and cryptosys-
tems [Dau09, Ros10]. At a high level, iris biometric template protection identification
systems follow Daugman’s principle [Dau04], which covers the entire process from the
enrollment of the image of an eye via the feature extraction to the authentication phase.
Along with their broad usage in practical applications with high security, ISO/IEC IS
24745 [ISO11] prescribes two major security requirements: irreversibility and unlinka-
bility. Irreversibility covers the case that the original iris data cannot be recovered from
the transformed features, and unlinkability means that different extracts from the same iris
cannot be linked, hence that they appear like mutually independent extracts. Needless to
say, iris biometric template protection systems need to comply with a wide range of other
security and efficiency properties, including privacy (see also Cimato et al. [CGP+09,
CGP+08]), security against key recovery, a low probability of false positives (see also
[ISO06]), speed, and so on. We refer to Jain et al. [JNN08] for a broad discussion of the
security requirements of various biometric template protection systems.
Rathgeb et al.’s Iris Biometric Template Protection System
Biometric template protection schemes are conventionally divided [RU11] into biometric
cryptosystems (such as fuzzy commitment and vault schemes [JS06, JW99] and shielding
functions [LT03]) and cancelable biometrics as introduced by Ratha et al. [RCB01]. The
idea of cancelable biometrics is to introduce an intentional, repeatable distortion of the
biometric input using a fixed transform. Upon authentication, the input signal is trans-
formed the same and verification is done in the transformed domain. Zuo et al. [ZRC08]
introduced various techniques for cancelable iris biometrics, and further noteworthy im-
provements have been presented by Ha¨mmerle-Uhl et al. [HPU09], Pillai et al. [PPCR11],
and Chong et al. [CJL06a, CJL06b].
The focus in this work lies on a recently proposed cancelable iris biometric template pro-
tection scheme from Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14], which we call RTPS throughout
this work. At the heart of RTPS are Bloom filters [Blo70]. Bloom filters are randomized
data structures that concisely represent a set in order to support membership queries, and
nowadays find a wide range of applications [BM03]. We introduce Bloom filters and basic
mathematical preliminaries in Section 2. RTPS is relatively simple, allows for high bio-
metric data compression, and is highly efficient as it mostly relies on binary operations.
The usage of Bloom filters enables irreversibility of RTPS, as can be demonstrated by ba-
sic mathematics. Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14] claim that unlinkability follows from
the usage of application-specific secrets. A formal proof of the latter claim is, unfortu-
nately, lacking. The RTPS scheme is explained in more detail in Sect. 3.
Our Contributions
While the irreversibility argument on RTPS for uniform random data is correct (it is para-
phrased in Sect. 4.1 for completeness), we observe that the scheme does not provide un-
linkability. To the contrary, in Sect. 4.2 we derive a simple and highly efficient attack
that, in the worst possible setting and most tolerant security model, succeeds with proba-
bility at least 96%. Most importantly, two different templates coming from the same iris
always have the same Hamming weight, yet ideally they would have unrelated Hamming
weights. This observation is already enough to break the unlinkability. Yet, also beyond
this undesirable property we present efficient combinatorial tricks to verify whether or not
two templates come from the same biometrics. While the main attack is described for the
case of two protected templates derived from the same feature vector, we also show how
it generalizes to the case of templates derived from different but related feature vectors in
Sect. 5.
We further analyze the scheme with respect to additional properties: false positives in
Sect. 4.3 and key recovery in Sect. 4.4. We derive attacks in reasonably efficient complex-
ities, such as generating false positives for the smaller versions of RTPS in a complexity of
at most 225, and recovering the key with complexity between 22 and 28. We nevertheless
remark that Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14] state that the application-specific secret is
only used to provide unlinkability security of RTPS, and no other security properties are
deduced of this secret.
The work is concluded in Sect. 5. In this section, we also identify the main pitfall of the
system that causes itself to be insecure, and discuss attempts of salvation. Unfortunately,
we remark that the attacks, and particularly the unlinkability attack, generalize to the most
straightforward fix, which consists of using multiple application-specific secret values per
transformation. We advocate for the usage of non-linear and non-invertible functions to
derive the Bloom filters, rather than the currently used linear mapping, a strengthening
which has also already been suggested in [RBBB14]. This fix will, however, naturally
degrade the efficiency of the scheme.
2 Bloom Filters
We start with a brief introduction on Bloom filters, a principle dating back to 1970 [Blo70].
We refer to Broder and Mitzenmacher [BM03] for a detailed discussion on Bloom filters
and their applications. Let k, n ≥ 1, and let h1, . . . , hk be hash functions with range
[0, n− 1]. A Bloom filter b is a binary array of length n ≥ 1, initialized (0, . . . , 0). To add
an element v to the Bloom filter, the bits in the Bloom filter at positions h1(v), . . . , hk(v) ∈
[0, n − 1] are set to 1. Likewise, to verify that an element w is in the Bloom filter, one
checks if b is 1 at positions h1(w), . . . , hk(w).
Bloom filters allow for false positives, incorrectly suggesting an element is in the Bloom
filter, but these are rather rare, if we assume the hash functions are random. In more detail,
if ` elements are added to a Bloom filter, the probability that a certain position of b is still
0 equals:
P (b is 0 at certain position) = (1− 1/n)k` ,
and a false positive is thus triggered with probability
(
1− (1− 1/n)k`
)k
. Additionally,
the expected number of 1’s in b is
E (|b|) = n
(
1− (1− 1/n)k`
)
≈ n
(
1− e−k`/n
)
.
3 Bloom Filter Based Iris Biometric Template Protection System
The iris biometric template protection system recently proposed by Rathgeb et al. [RBB13,
RBBB14], which we call RTPS throughout, is a mapping that takes as input a binary ma-
trix M of width W and height H , which is derived from an iris in some way. We disre-
gard the generation of this matrix M from iris biometric, and refer to [RBB13, RBBB14,
BHF08] for a detailed discussion on this topic. Throughout, we consider uniformly ran-
domly generated M , unless specified otherwise. RTPS then transforms M into K Bloom
filters of length 2H , for some security parameter K ≥ 1.1 In more detail, the mapping
RTPS operates as follows (see also Fig. 1). Firstly, the input matrix M is parsed into K
submatrices of width W/K and height H (silently assuming that W/K is integral):
M −→ [M1 · · ·MK ] .
1The original scheme allows for Bloom filters of length 2w ≤ 2H , but we focus on w = H .
Figure 1: The iris biometric template protection system RTPS of Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14]
For i = 1, . . . ,K, the submatrices Mi are then transformed to Bloom filters bi as follows:
every columnMi[j] ∈ {0, 1}H (for j = 1, . . . ,W/K) is XORed with some predetermined
application-specific secret value T , the obtained value Mi[j] ⊕ T is transformed to an
integer in [0, 2H − 1], and the Bloom filter bi is set to 1 at this position.
For further analysis, we briefly introduce two definitions. We define by bin2int the func-
tion that transforms an H-bit binary string to an integer in [0, 2H − 1] and by int2bin the
inverse of bin2int.
Formally, RTPS employs hash function h(v) = bin2int(v ⊕ T ) ∈ [0, 2H − 1], where
T ∈ {0, 1}H is an application-specific secret value, and applies it to all columns Mi[j] of
Mi. As remarked by Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14], this secret T is used in order to
provide unlinkability between multiple different templates of a single subject and it does
not serve any security properties.
Verification is done the obvious way, by verifying if bi is set to 1 at position h(Mi[j]) for
j = 1, . . . ,W/K and i = 1, . . . ,K.
Typical parameter sets are W = 1024, H ∈ {8, 9, 10}, and ` = W/K ∈ {25, 26, 27, 28}.
That is, most analysis in [RBB13,RBBB14] is done for these parameters, with best claimed
performance for H = 10 and ` = K = 32. We will stick to these parameters choices.
4 Security Assessment
We present a security analysis of RTPS. In Sect. 4.1, we elaborate on the irreversibil-
ity analysis of RTPS as presented in [RBB13, RBBB14]. Then, we present attacks on
unlinkability, false positives, and key recoveries in Sects. 4.2-4.4.
4.1 Irreversibility
An irreversibility argument for RTPS for the case of uniformly random data is given in
[RBB13, RBBB14], but we summarize the findings in our own terminology. Suppose that
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Figure 2: Number of possible matrices of width ` ∈ {25, 26, 27, 28} for given Bloom filter b, as
function of |b|. Here, ` = 25 is the bottom line and ` = 28 the top line. The graphs are in log2 scale.
a Bloom filter b, after ` = W/K elements added to it, contains |b| ones. Then the number
of possible matrices M of width ` that could have lead to b is given by
f(|b|, `) =
|b|∑
i=1
(−1)|b|−i
(|b|
i
)
i`,
which follows from a simple application of the inclusion-exclusion principle.2 A recur-
sive variant of this function is given in [RBB13, RBBB14]. For various choices of |b|
and `, this function f(|b|, `) is plotted in Fig. 2. An irreversibility attack would consist
of guessing a matrix M∗ that could have lead to b, and is typically successful with prob-
ability 1/f(|b|, `). It is clear that RTPS provides irreversibility. Indeed, for E (|b|) ≈
2H
(
1− e−`/2H
)
, this success probability equals
` = 25 ` = 26 ` = 27 ` = 28
H = 8 2−124.493 2−317.698 2−777.341 2−1805.82
H = 9 2−121.617 2−311.085 2−763.644 2−1809.62
H = 10 2−117.663 2−304.911 2−748.228 2−1779.99
We remark that these computations only hold for uniformly randomly generated data M .
This is usually not the case as correlation may occur among the data, and this may make
the Bloom filters reversible.
2In more detail, given the |b| positions, there are |b|` possible matrices whose columns set one only at these
|b| positions, but this includes matrices that set one at only |b| − 1 of the positions. By the inclusion-exclusion
principle, we have to subtract these
( |b|
|b|−1
)
(|b| − 1)`, and proceed similarly for i = |b| − 2, . . . , 1.
4.2 Unlinkability
Unlinkability means that templates from a single object look indistinguishable from each
other. Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14] claim that unlinkability is provided by incor-
porating an application specific bit vector T ∈ {0, 1}H , although no proof is given. We
demonstrate that RTPS does not provide unlinkability, by presenting a practical attack that
matches two templates derived from a single subject using different secret bit vectors. We
first consider the general attack for the case of one matrix block. Then, we elaborate on
the case of K > 1 matrix blocks.
The idea of unlinkability is that two Bloom filters b, b′ derived from the same data (using
a different secret) should appear mutually independent. In other words, we consider the
case where an adversary is given either these two filters b, b′, or two completely random
and mutually independent filters c, c′, and its goal is to distinguish the two settings. Before
proceeding, we remark that our attacks do not imply a distinguishability attack in case we
consider two protected templates created out of two different biometric feature vectors.
Nevertheless, the attacks generalize to the case of two related (yet not entirely the same)
biometric feature vectors. We elaborate on this setting in Sect. 5.
One Block
Let M be an arbitrary matrix of width ` = W/K and height H . Let T, T ′ ∈ {0, 1}H
be two independently and uniformly randomly generated secret values. Denote by b the
Bloom filter of M under secret T and similarly by b′ the Bloom filter under T ′.
The attack relies on basic mathematics and combinatorial tricks, and we start with a high-
level intuition of it. As first observation, we point out that b and b′ always have the same
Hamming weight, while this would ideally not be the case. In more detail, two completely
random Bloom filters of size 2H for H ∈ {8, 9, 10} have the same Hamming weight
with probability at most 0.04 (formal computation below). We additionally demonstrate
that even if we are comparing (b, b′) with two random Bloom filters (c, c′) of the same
Hamming weight, there exist efficient combinatorial tricks to verify whether or not two
templates come from the same biometrics. These tricks in essence use that every index i for
which b is non-zero corresponds to a columnM [j] ofM such that bin2int(M [j]⊕T ) = i.
The same holds for b′. Then, if |b| = |b′| is even, an XOR of all indices for which b is
set equals an XOR of all indices for which b′ is set (as an XOR of an even number of T ’s
and an even number of T ′’s cancel out). For the case of odd |b| = |b′| a slightly more
involved but similar approach is taken. In the remainder of this section, we present the
formal mathematics behind these attacks.
More formally, the attack relies on the following simple but important observation. For
any j, j′ ∈ [1, `]:
M [j]⊕ T =M [j′]⊕ T ⇐⇒M [j] =M [j′]⇐⇒M [j]⊕ T ′ =M [j′]⊕ T ′,
which means that collisions in b occur if and only if they occur in b′ if and only if they occur
inM in the first place. Define by I, I ′ ⊆ [0, 2H−1] the index sets of all positions at which
b (resp. b′) is 1. Let J ⊆ [1, `] be the maximal set of indices such that {M [j] | j ∈ J}
contains no duplicate elements. By above observation, |I| = |I ′| = |J | =: α. This already
allows for a linkability attack: two truly random Bloom filters c, c′ would not satisfy this
condition in the first place, except with probability at most
P (|c| = |c′|) =
2H∑
i=0
P (|c| = |c′| = i) =
2H∑
i=0
P (|c| = i) · P (|c| = i)
=
2H∑
i=0
((
2H
i
)(
1
2
)2H)2
=
(
2H+1
2H
)(
1
2
)2H+1
.
(1)
This term is at most 0.04 for H ∈ {8, 9, 10}. We nevertheless proceed, assuming b, b′ are
compared with two filters c, c′ of the same weight.
First assume α is even. Then,⊕
i∈I
int2bin(i) =
⊕
j∈J
M [j]⊕ T =
⊕
j∈J
M [j]⊕ T ′ =
⊕
i∈I′
int2bin(i), (2)
where the first and third step are by construction and the middle step as α = |J | is even and
thus
⊕
j∈J T = 0 =
⊕
j∈J T
′. If α is odd, (2) does not exactly hold and a slightly more
elaborate analysis is needed. Let i∗ ∈ I be an arbitrarily chosen index. By construction,
there exist i′∗ ∈ I ′ and j∗ ∈ J such that⊕
i∈I\{i∗}
int2bin(i) =
⊕
j∈J\{j∗}
M [j]⊕ T =
⊕
j∈J\{j∗}
M [j]⊕ T ′ =
⊕
i∈I′\{i′∗}
int2bin(i).
Unfortunately, these values i′∗, j∗ are unknown. Yet, there are only α possible values i′∗
and we have: ⊕
i∈I\{i∗}
int2bin(i) ∈
{ ⊕
i∈I′\{i′∗}
int2bin(i)
∣∣∣∣∣ i′∗ ∈ I ′
}
. (3)
In other words, for two Bloom filters b, b′ derived from the same M , either (2) or (3)
holds. Two truly random Bloom filters c, c′ would set (2) with probability 1/2H and (3)
with probability α/2H ≤ `/2H . (We remark that this bound is rather loose, as many
collisions may occur once ` ≥ 2H/2. In more detail, we have E (α/2H) ≈ 1 − e−`/2H
(cf. Sect. 2).) Recall that random Bloom filters c, c′ would not satisfy |c| = |c′| in the
first place, except with the probability computed in (1). Combining these observations, the
linkability attack is successful with probability at least
1− `
2H
P (|c| = |c′|) = 1− `
2H
(
2H+1
2H
)(
1
2
)2H+1
,
which achieves its minimum for H = 8 and ` = 28 at 0.964755. The advantage only
increases for higher values of H and smaller values of `. This means that our attack
succeeds with a probability of more than 96%.
K Blocks
In RTPS, the matrix M is first parsed into K submatrices [M1 · · ·MK ]. The above-
mentioned unlinkability attack can be applied to all of these blocks, leading to a success
with probability of at least
1−
(
`
2H
(
2H+1
2H
)(
1
2
)2H+1)K
,
which achieves its minimum for H = 8 and ` =W/K = 28 at 0.999998.
We remark that in the general case of K > 1 blocks the protected templates show another
undesirable feature [Rat14]. Denote by b = [b1 · · · bK ] the Bloom filters of M under
secret T and similarly by b′ = [b′1 · · · b′K ] the Bloom filters under T ′. Then, every row of
b appears as a row of b′ and vice versa. Formally, b′ = P · b for some permutation matrix
P of size 2H . This is, in fact, a generalization of the above-mentioned observation for
K = 1, and also allows an adversary to easily link b and b′ with probability close to 1.
4.3 False Positives
We consider the probability of an adversary to generate a false positive for the scheme,
i.e., to generate an input that is incorrectly viewed as a legitimate input. We remark, as
we will also elaborate on later, that the probability of generating a false positive equals the
expected false accept ratio.
In Sect. 2 we computed the probability of a false positive, provided the Bloom filters are
generated based on uniformly randomly generated data M . However, if v gives a false
positive for Bloom filter bi, then the matrix M∗i that consists of W/K repetitions of v
gives a false positive. Admittedly, M∗i does not look like a legitimate block from an iris,
but is does not need to be: an adversary may spoof the system in any way. Based on this
observation, we note that a matrix M∗ consisting of W repetitions of a randomly chosen
vector v results in a false positive for RTPS with probability
Pfp :=
(
1− (1− 1/2H)W/K)K .
We remark that Pfp is equal to the expected false accept rate. In more detail, the false
accept rate is the number of successful attempts divided by the number of attempts. If the
adversary makes X random attempts, the expected number of successful attempts equals
XPfp, and hence
E (false accept rate) =
XPfp
X
= Pfp.
For W = 1024 and the various choices of H and K, this value equals:
K = 22 K = 23 K = 24 K = 25
H = 8 2−2.64035 2−10.748 2−34.7856 2−98.7706
H = 9 2−5.37836 2−17.4027 2−49.4065 2−129.391
H = 10 2−8.70385 2−24.7085 2−64.7067 2−160.697
While the values for K = 25 are adequate and meet current standards, the remaining con-
figurations yield questionable (in case H = 10,K = 24) to non-sufficient (the remaining
cases) security levels.
We stress that this computation holds for the case of uniformly random input data. In case
the matrixM is not entirely random, or more detailed if columns ofM can be guessed with
a probability higher than usual, the success probability of a false positive increases drasti-
cally. As an example, suppose one single vector vi of a submatrix Mi is leaked. Clearly,
a false positive for bi is generated with probability one (just input a matrix consisting of `
repetitions of vi). What is more, correlations among the submatrices render a significant
increase in the construction of false positives for the remaining submatrices. This is partic-
ularly perilous as data obtained from an iris shows high correlations between neighboring
columns [Dau03,Dau04,Dau06,HBF09]. We refer to [VS11] for a more detailed treatment
on how to generate false successful iris textures from an original iris texture.
4.4 Key Recovery
As a bonus, we consider the possibility to recover the secret value T , given the input data
M and output Bloom filters b. We stress that Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14] state that
the application-specific secret is only used to provide unlinkability security of RTPS, and
no other security properties are deduced of this secret.
Without loss of generality, we discuss the case of one block only. We will present a naive
guessing attack and a more sophisticated attack, and both rely on basic probability theory.
LetM denote a uniformly randomly generated matrix of width ` and heightH , and denote
its corresponding Bloom filter by b. Our goal is to recover secret key T ∈ {0, 1}H , given
M and b. Inheriting notation of Sect. 4.2, denote by I ⊆ [0, 2H − 1] the index set of
all positions at which b is 1, and let J ⊆ [1, `] be the maximal set of indices such that
{M [j] | j ∈ J} contains no duplicate. Again, we have |I| = |J | =: α. By construction,
for every i ∈ I there is a unique j ∈ J such that
int2bin(i) =M [j]⊕ T. (4)
Hence, any choice (i∗, j∗) ∈ I×J satisfies (4) with probability 1/α ≥ 1/`, in which case
it leads to a key recovery. For the proposed parameter choices of ` ∈ {25, 26, 27, 28}, this
implies that the secret value T can be recovered with probability ranging between 1/25
and 1/28.
The more sophisticated attack consists of smartly verifying links between I and J . Fix
arbitrary distinct i, i′, and write Z = int2bin(i) ⊕ int2bin(i′). Denote by JJ the set
of all pairs (j, j′) ⊆ J such that M [j] ⊕ M [j′] = Z. By basic probability we have
E (|JJ |) = (α2)/2H , and Markov’s inequality states that, for any A ∈ {1, . . . , `/2},
P (|JJ | ≤ A) ≥ 1− E (|JJ |) /A.
We proceed with the key recovery attack. The trick we will use is that the couple (i, i′)
corresponds to exactly one (j, j′) ∈ JJ , in which case i corresponds to either M [j] or
M [j′] (and i′ to the other one). Formally:
int2bin(i)⊕ T ∈
{
M [j],M [j′]
∣∣∣ (j, j′) ∈ JJ}.
A key recovery consists of selecting any j∗ among the 2|JJ | possibilities, and guessing
T ∗ = int2bin(i)⊕M [j∗]. We find:
P (T ∗ = T ) ≥ P (T ∗ = T ∣∣ |JJ | ≤ 2E (|JJ |)) · P (|JJ | ≤ 2E (|JJ |))
≥ 1
4E (|JJ |) ·
1
2
≥ 2
H
4`2
.
This attack improves over the naive one as long as ` ≤ 2H−2.
5 Conclusions
We presented a security analysis of the recently proposed iris biometric template protec-
tion system of Rathgeb et al. [RBB13, RBBB14]. While on the one hand we reconfirm
Rathgeb et al.’s irreversibility security analysis for uniformly random data, we debunk
the unlinkability claim by presenting a practical attack that distinguishes two Bloom fil-
ters b, b′ generated from the same data from two independent ones c, c′ with a probability
of at least 96%. We additionally analyzed adversarial success probabilities in generating
false positives and in key recoveries, leading to undesirably low attack complexities: 225
for generating false positives for the smaller versions of the scheme, and a complexity
between 22 and 28 for recovering the secret key.
The weaknesses are mainly caused by the fact that RTPS uses only one hash function
and that it is a very simple one. At first sight, a possible solution lies in employing two
hash functions based on different secret values T1 and T2. While this would, indeed, be a
countermeasure against the attacks of Sect. 4, we remark that the linkability attack would
still persist, be it as a slightly more elaborate combinatorial exercise. Here, the trick is to
observe that although |I| and |I ′| increase and are not necessarily the same, |J | remains
unchanged. The procedure of Sect. 4.2 should then be applied on all subsets of I of size
|J |. A similar reasoning applies to the case two Bloom filters b, b′ are derived from two
different but related feature vectorsM,M ′. For this, assumeM,M ′ are the same at `′ < `
columns. Identify the set J as before, but then for the `′ columns only. Then, the procedure
of Sect. 4.2 should similarly be applied on all subsets of I of size |J |.
A possible fix to salvage RTPS, which has also been suggested in [RBBB14], is the usage
of non-linear and non-invertible functions to derive the Bloom filters, instead of the linear
mapping currently employed, but this will degrade the efficiency of the scheme.
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